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RETHINKING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
WORKPLACE: UNIONS AND WORKPLACE
DEMOCRACY
Doug Gamble and Nina Greggt
Throughout the world, workplaces remain "contested terrain" nearly
twenty years after economist Richard Edwards wrote an influential book by
that name.' In 1979, Edwards used the concept of "contested terrain" to
describe the dynamic of workplace struggles over the control of the labor
process in the twentieth century. Edwards argued that the struggle's
foundation in capitalist production would continue to determine how work
and the relations between workers and employers would be organized.
'Workers are treated fairly within the rules," he wrote, "but they have no
say in establishing the rules."4 Struggles over the material conditions of
employment, upon which Edwards focused, continue, but the boundaries of
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1. RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
WORKPLACE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 22 (1979). Many of the ideas in this essay and
case study were developed during the authors' preparation of an extended case study of
efforts by a union and a succession of plant managers to develop a union-management
partnership. We presented the case study, "Revisiting Contested Terrain: Discerning the
Meanings of Labor-Management Partnerships, or, What Do You Do Every Day?" at the
1997 annual convention of the National Communication Association. The conference
presentation led to the publication of Nina Gregg & Doug Gamble, Can Labor and
Management Work as Partners?, AT WORK, July-Aug. 1998, at 13, in which some of the
material in this essay and case first appeared.
2. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 22.
3. See id.
4. Id.
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the contested terrain have expanded. Today, more than was the case when
Edwards wrote, workplace struggles over wages, hours, working
conditions, and terms of employment take place in an environment marked
by contests over the meaning of concepts like empowerment,5 employee
67involvement, and partnership. The outcomes of these struggles, and the
involvement of trade unions in them, will determine the nature of
workplaces in the twenty-first century, including the extent to which
workplaces become democratic organizations.
8
In the United States, the frameworks of labor law and corporate law
shape the inevitable struggles over the control of workplaces by
establishing various rights, obligations, and responsibilities for employers,
employees, trade unions, worker organizations, corporate boards of
directors, pension fund managers, shareholders, and other interested
parties. Because most labor statutes were adopted in a political and
economic climate that was quite different from today's, some rethinking is
appropriate. This challenge is particularly important for those who
encourage and support democratic workplaces.
In this essay, we describe the climate in which trade unionists have
addressed issues of workplace democracy and the legal framework within
which those efforts take place. Part I comments on some of the discourses
5. For a best-selling example of the popular literature on empowerment, see WILLIAM
C. BYHAM & JEFF Cox, ZAPP! THm LIGHTNING OF EMPOWERMENT (1998). For a more
thoughtful popular perspective, see KEN BLANCHARD ET AL., EMPOWERMENT TAKES MORE
THAN A MINUTE (1996). For a range of critique, see generally MAKING QUALITY CRrITCAL:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE (Adrian Wilkinson & Hugh Wilmott eds.,
1995).
6. See Carmen Sirianni, Worker Participation in the Late Twentieth Century: Some
Critical Issues, in WORKER PARTICIPATION AND THE POLIcs OF REFORM 3 (Carmen Sirianni
ed., 1987), for a useful discussion of the history of worker participation and the issues about
power that it raises for society.
7. See John R. Stepp & Thomas J. Schneider, Union-Management Partnerships,
PERSP. ON WORK, Aug. 1997, at 54, for a brief review of the definitions of partnership,
including those documented in dictionaries of law, finance, and psychology. Stepp and
Schneider also offer their own model of union-management partnership and the quid pro
quos they identify as fundamental features of a union-management partnership. See id.
8. The meanings of "workplace democracy" and "democratic workplace" are
themselves contested. Some commentators use these terms to describe work sites where
individual workers have some control over the tasks they perform while others use the terms
only to describe situations in which workers as a group must have some role in making
decisions about the governance and structure of the workplace.
For recent discussions of workplace democracy, see PETER BACHRACH & ARYEH
BOTWINICK, POWER AND EMPOWERMENT: A RADICAL THEORY OF PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY (1992); George Cheney, Does Workplace Democracy Have a Future?, AT
WORK, May-June 1998, at 15; George Cheney et al., Democracy, Participation, and
Communication at Work: A Multidisciplinary Review, in COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 21, at
35 (Michael R. Roloff ed., 1998); and Susan J. Schurman & Adrienne E. Eaton, Labor and
Workplace Democracy: Past, Present and Future, LAB. STUD. J., Summer 1996, at 3.
WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY
on employee empowerment and involvement from the perspectives of both
employers and employees. Part II reflects our experiences through a case
study of the six-year history of an intermittent labor-management
partnership in a unionized manufacturing plant. Part II also illustrates the
efforts of workers and managers to propose, develop, and sustain new
relationships within the constraints of current law. Part ImI describes the
climate required both to encourage and to sustain labor-management
partnerships. Finally, Part IV specifically addresses the roles and
responsibilities of trade unions in forming nontraditional relationships with
employers.
I. NEW DISCOURSES AROUND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS
For most of the 1990s, consultants and management theorists have
bombarded employers with exhortations to "empower" and "involve" their
employees as a means to achieving a competitive edge in a global
economy. As a result, workers often are invited, encouraged, and
occasionally required to form partnerships with their employers, contrib-
uting shop-floor and skill-based knowledge and exerting peer pressure on
other workers, in an effort to attract and keep customers in crowded
markets.
In fact, in 1998 the air is thick with talk of partnerships. For example,
Starbucks, the chain that seeks to become every neighborhood's local
coffee shop, recently extended a newly-bargained wage increase to all of its
Canadian employees, after having previously resisted giving the increase to
116 workers who were members of the Canadian Auto Workers Union in
British Columbia. As the Starbucks spokesperson explained, "[t]his is a
matter of being fair and equitable to all of our partners." 9 Describing a
recent contract settlement, BellSouth Vice-President Dick Sibbemsen said
that his company's success depends on "employees being willing to work
in new ways and CWA [the Communication Workers of America] being
willing to partner with the company."'
0
Moreover, organizational theorists advocate various techniques for
enlisting workers' input to improve quality and productivity. In the
publication that marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Industrial Relations
Research Association, Robert McKersie, who co-authored A Behavioral
Theory of Labor Negotiations" with Richard Walton in 1965, referred to
9. Jefferson Decker, Better Lattj than Never, IN THEsE TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at 6, 6.
10. BellSouth-CIWA Pact Calls for Better Company-Union Relations, KNOXVILLE
Nvs-SENTINEL, Aug. 11, 1998, at C1.
11. RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATIONS (1965).
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labor-management partnerships as the current frontier.' 2 Finally, thousands
of managers and workers attend conferences and workshops to hear other
managers and workers describe how "empowered" workers have created
"lean" and effective work sites and new working relationships.
Generally, the rhetoric of empowerment used by consultants and
managers deals with employees as individuals and work sites as discrete
locations. Most advocates of "new" workplaces do not distinguish between
those where workers are represented by a union and those where they are
not. 13  This tendency to focus on individual employees disregards the
potential contribution of unions to the quest for increased employee
involvement. As a result, trade unionists are on the defensive and
discouraged from thinking that overtures from management might offer
important opportunities to advance trade unions' own institutional interests.
For trade unionists, the discourses of total quality, worker
involvement, empowerment, and partnership compete with traditional trade
union ideas. Historically, the essence of trade unionism has been collective
identity in opposition to the interests of employers. In contrast, the
corporate discourse addresses employees (often called "associates" or
"partners") as individuals whose interests are the same, or should be the
same, as those of their employers. The competition between these
discourses, especially the contests over what each means for relations of
power in the workplace, challenges trade unionists' historic understandings
regarding unions' representation of workers.14
The new discourses on the workplace, such as empowerment and
partnership, reconfigure the terrain open for negotiation between unions
12. See Robert McKersie, Negotiations: From Theory to Practice, PERSP. ON WORK,
Aug. 1997, at 10, 13.
13. Political and social theorists have been more likely than organizational consultants
to understand that worker involvement, in the words of sociologist Carmen Sirianni, "has
always been implicated in the conflicts of the workplace, the politics of skill and union
organization, and very often in the distribution of political power in the larger social
system." Sirianni, supra note 6, at 3.
14. Several recently published books address the challenges to trade unionists of these
initiatives; each also contains a useful bibliography. See, e.g., LEAN WORK: EMPOWERMENT
AND EXPLOITATION IN THE GLOBAL AUTO INDUSTRY (Steve Babson ed., 1995); NORTH
AMERICAN AUTO UNIONS IN CRISIS: LEAN PRODUCTION AS CONTESTED TERRAIN (William C.
Green and Ernest J. Yanarella eds., 1996); UNIONS AND WORKPLACE REORGANIZATION
(Bruce Nissen ed., 1997).
For a useful discussion of American and Canadian unions' responses to these
challenges, see Donald M. Wells, Recent Innovations in Labour-Management Relations:
The Risks and Prospects for Labour in Canada and the United States, in THE CHALLENGE OF
RESTRUCTURING: NORTH AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENTS RESPOND 287 (Jane Jenson &
Rianne Mahon eds., 1993).
See Howard Botwinick, Labor Must Shed Its Win/Win Illusions: It's Time to Organize
and Fight, Nmv LAB. F., Spring 1998, at 92, for a reminder that trade unions should not
accept profit maximization and competition as their goals.
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and employers. The boundaries between management and labor-between
"management's rights" and what may be bargained over collectively-are
enshrined in the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and have shaped
union-management relations in the United States for nearly fifty years.
However, these boundaries have been made porous by virtue of
management inviting employees to pursue a different kind of relationship
and by union responses to the overtures.
These initiatives are complicated and present a variety of opportunities
for new relationships. Some employers pursue profits by advocating
employee involvement while others close plants and lay off workers. Still
others pursue both strategies simultaneously. Some unions try to represent
their members by resisting all management initiatives regarding
nontraditional subjects of bargaining while others agree to essentially
whatever management says will save jobs. Still others employ both tactics
simultaneously. Trade unionists and managers are both navigating
unfamiliar territory, and neither has a consistent or common agenda.
II. CASE STUDY: THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP AT
TRANSPARTS
The labor-management relationship forged over six years at
TransParts, 15 a nearly thirty-year-old manufacturing plant, illustrates the
complex challenges to changing traditional workplaces. Simultaneously,
the TransParts case study contributes to the small but growing collection of
resource materials that provide examples of the necessity of daily vigilance,
on terrains both old and new, to people engaging in the formation of new
kinds of labor-management relationships.
A. Laying the Foundation for a Labor-Management Partnership
The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union ("ACTWU")
had represented employees at the TransParts plant since the early 1970s.
Over two decades, TransParts shrank from a manufacturing and assembly
facility employing over 2000 workers to a component manufacturing plant
with a workforce of about 250. The defining event during this period was
the union's refusal to accept a mid-contract demand for major wage
concessions in 1982. As a consequence, the company moved the plant's
assembly work first to a non-union plant in the United States and then to
Mexico. After this move, labor relations were oppositional and
15. TransParts is a pseudonym for a unionized manufacturing plant in a city in the
southeastern United States. Until the fall of 1997, TransParts was wholly owned by a
"Fortune 100" multinational corporation. A smaller but rapidly growing company in the
same industry now owns it.
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contentious, and the union remained highly distrustful of the absentee
parent corporation that had sought the concessions and moved the jobs.
Early in 1991, the plant manager at TransParts contacted the union's
international representative regarding upcoming contract negotiations. He
asked whether the union would be willing to draft contract language that
would enable the parties to develop more of a partnership and to move
beyond the old "us versus them" relationship. As a result of this invitation,
the 1991-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement between TransParts and
ACTWU contained language under a section entitled "Continuous
Improvement and Employee Involvement" in which both parties
"recognize[d] the value of encouraging and rewarding employee
participation, and of developing a relationship where the Company,
employees and the Union participate as partners. 16 The specific language
in the agreement was not especially well designed or much discussed
during the bargaining period. Three factors encouraged this oversight: 1)
the union had no reason to think the parent corporation was serious about
developing a more cooperative relationship; 2) neither the union nor the
local company had much experience bargaining over these kinds of issues;
and 3) the union was distracted by more familiar issues like a complicated
proposal for a new department and the incorporation of an entirely new
venture that would manufacture a different product for the same market.
The contract had many elements, the most complex of which was the
management of the new venture by a corporation that was a joint venture
between TransParts and another company. TransParts insisted-and the
union eventually agreed-that the new production employees would be
paid less than those in TransParts, that they would work in teams, and that
the new department would have only one job classification rather than the
multiple classifications that had evolved in the older plant.
In the aftermath of these negotiations that combined the potential for
new partnerships and the familiar struggle over wages, benefits, and
working conditions, ACTWU and local TransParts management set about
forging a new relationship. This endeavor was shaped, at least initially, by
the directive of the TransParts parent corporation to implement a specific
Total Quality Management ("TQM") program throughout its worldwide
operations. Recognizing the opportunity to make real improvements, the
local plant manager wanted both ACTWU and the plant's management
group to ensure that the TQM initiative would be effective.
To this end, the parties requested assistance from two external
organizational change consultants recommended by the union. Almost
16. Agreement Between TransParts and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union AFL, CIO, at 76 (July 22, 1991 - July 21, 1996) (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law) [hereinafter TransParts Agreement].
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immediately, conflict arose over the direction and details of the new
relationship. TransParts management pressed for implementation of the
corporation's TQM program without any consideration of the role of the
union. However, the new partnership language in the collective bargaining
agreement had raised the union's expectations regarding how it could
legitimately engage management. The union now insisted that the TQM
program be developed as part of the locally-designed partnership initiative.
Despite the directive of the collective bargaining agreement to form a
partnership, the training and implementation schedule embedded in the
corporation's TQM program slowly encroached on time and other
resources (including commitment) necessary for joint work with the
consultants to design and implement a new labor management relationship.
During this period, the union and management from both the
TransParts plant and the new joint venture worked as one Labor Manage-
ment Steering Committee ("LMSC") under the guidance of the external
consultants. The new venture had few hourly employees, and its manager
was its only representative on the LMSC. He attended infrequently and
was seldom involved in the LMSC's deliberations. His absence revealed a
fundamental tension between the management groups of TransParts and the
joint venture, a tension that still exists six years later.
One early LMSC project was the development of a
Labor/Management Vision Statement, with a point of disagreement being
whether to mention the union by name. Another more innovative task was
to develop an understanding of the levels of union involvement in various
operational decisions such as training, equipment layout, product develop-
ment, and capital expenditures. The LMSC agreed to specific levels of
involvement for different kinds of decisions, following the consultants'
five-part model of levels of partnership, in which a party: 1) may simply be
informed, 2) may be consulted, 3) may develop a business plan, 4) may
have input in decision making, or 5) at the highest level, may be fully
involved in the final decision.
After these initial steps, the union and management jointly developed
a process for involving task-chartered, problem-solving teams throughout
the factory. For much of the next year, the union and management
struggled to make the partnership work, often arguing over the process and
over the relative importance of the parent corporation's goals in relation to
the tasks of the partnership initiative.
The disagreements became increasingly serious when the TransParts
plant manager suddenly resigned in 1993. A manager who had little
experience with labor relations replaced him. The new plant manager's
inadequate understanding of the local partnership became clear when he
referred to the partnership as a single entity with the power and authority to
take action, rather than as a relationship between two parties. This
1998]
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confusion became a recurring theme in nearly every aspect of the
partnership, especially as turnover in plant managers occurred roughly
every two years. Indeed, this distinction--seeing the partnership as a
relationship between two independent organizations trying to work
together, rather than as one organization with one mission-was the central
issue in an ongoing dialogue about the relationship between the goals of the
local partnership and the business objectives of the parent corporation.
Despite these obstacles, the new TransParts plant manager, his
management team, and the local union leadership struggled to develop a
shared understanding of the partnership agreement and its implications for
daily interactions on the shop floor. By the fall of 1993, a new textile
department at TransParts, which had been negotiated into the 1991-1996
Collective Bargaining Agreement, was up and running. In addition, the
new venture had begun hiring workers and was moving towards
production. The new venture had also fired its first plant manager and
replaced him with a TransParts department manager who had been part of
the partnership work there.
The union's continued vigilance in challenging management's
unilateral actions within the framework of the emergent partnership
relationship, along with the outcomes of those challenges, called into
question the likelihood of a mutually respectful association. Then, in
November 1993, the LMSC, the new venture's plant manager, and one of
the new production workers held a two-day, off-site meeting to assess their
progress and revisit their agreements about the union's involvement in
decision making. It was a tense and poorly managed event that ended with
various commitments and action plans.
Despite these agreements, the new year began with little shared confi-
dence in the partnership. TransParts management did not have an effective
champion of the partnership and declined to retain the external consultants
who had facilitated the first two years of the partnership relationship and
the off-site meeting. Meanwhile, the new venture was overwhelmed by
start-up production demands. Still, the LMSC continued to meet and tried
to realize some of the potential of earlier discussions. That potential
suffered a serious setback, however, when the premise of mutual respect
underlying the partnership was shattered in one of the more familiar arenas
of labor-management relations-a union organizing campaign.
B. Which Side Are You On?
In the spring of 1994, organizers for ACTWU began a campaign to
organize hourly employees at two TransParts-related facilities in a nearby
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town.17 Among the union organizers was the vice-president of the local
union at the plant where the partnership language had been negotiated.
This twenty-year TransParts production employee had recently become a
full-time TQM trainer with the title of Union Developer, an hourly position
that was created as a result of the early developmental work with the
external consultants. 18
ACTWU's international representative to the TransParts local union
was also involved in the organizing campaign, and both the union local's
vice-president and international representative were active participants in
the partnership development process. The company's managers conducted
an antiunion campaign at the targeted plants, without the involvement of
management at the older TransParts plant. Written communication from
the management of the targeted plants to their employees about the union
organizing campaign contained several inflammatory statements, including:
"[t]his ACTWU union will say just about anything in order to get you to
sign one of their cards. It doesn't matter to the union whether it's the truth
or a lie. Whatever sounds good. Whatever the union thinks you want to
hear,"'19 and "[w]e sincerely believe that this union would be a very bad
thing for all of us. This union's record speaks for itself. It creates a
negative work environment and thrives on dissension and conflict between
employees and management as well as conflict among co-workers." 20
17. TransParts wholly owned one of these plants; the other was a joint venture with
another company. Both plants were customers of the TransParts plant. The opening of
these plants had provoked a major dispute between the union and the parent company in the
late 1980s when the union lost an effort to have the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") certify the new plants as part of the existing bargaining unit. During this dispute,
no one believed or even claimed that the union and the company were partners.
18. One element of the negotiated commitment to develop a partnership was to engage
external consultants, chosen by union and management, to aid in the crafting of processes
and structures to facilitate the formation of new relationships and govern conversation on
subjects formerly relegated to management (such as work process and capital expenditure
decisions). Among these new structures was the creation of the full-time hourly position of
Union Developer. The responsibilities of the position included participating in the develop-
ment of new relationships, working as a plant-wide trainer, and acting as a communication
link between the LMSC and the entire workforce of the plant. The name given to this
position is significant-the title of Union Developer represented the objective of building
the union through the partnership process.
Two years later, the position was referred to in conversation, as well as in written
documents, as Team Development Specialist, a title common in the management literature
on developing team-based work systems. The explicit acknowledgement of the union's
institutional objectives was lost; both the hourly and salaried employees doing this job had
the same title. In late 1995, the title of Union Developer was restored in writing only, in the
Governance Diagram approved by the LMSC.
19. Union Facts (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and
Employment Law).
20. Letter from TransParts Managers to Fellow Employees I (June 2, 1994) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law).
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While the use of antiunion rhetoric was not surprising, it reminded the
workers engaged in the partnership at TransParts that the parent
corporation did not share their commitment. The corporation's antiunion
behavior also evoked TransParts workers' historical mistrust of
management. Local union leadership, long familiar with the distinction
between management and the particular managers with whom they were
building relationships, recognized the impossibility of building a partner-
ship in one part of the system while accusations of untrustworthiness were
circulating literally down the road.
The union tried to enlist the help of the president of the relevant
division of the parent corporation, requesting "a meeting with appropriate
and responsible company representatives... before company activities
permanently damage our relationship. ' 21 In his reply, the president refused
to intervene, defended the corporation's actions, and acknowledged the
"positive relationship" with the union in the older facility, stating that he
"look[ed] forward to developing an effective partnership... in our
employee involvement initiatives. 2 2
A more civil line of antiunion argument from the management of one
of the targeted plants pointed out that the union organizers had not shown
how the union could contribute to the viability of the company. In a letter
to "Fellow Employees and Families," one plant manager wrote, "I have not
seen any literature published by this union that portrays a concern for our
customers or our performance. No concern for keeping our plant healthy
and in business!" 23  Indeed, the union's organizing approach focused
almost entirely on the traditional terrain of wages, hours, and working
conditions, missing an opportunity to take advantage of the active
engagement of ACTWU union members in the partnership process at
TransParts.
Besides capturing the tension between the old and new discourses of
workplace relations, the president's letter posed a dilemma for the union.
Should its serious commitment to workplace democracy in one
enterprise-the TransParts plant where workers were actively forging a
partnership-be sacrificed to the same union's desire to organize and
represent additional employees of the same company in other locations?
The temptation was strong for the union to abandon its efforts to develop a
working partnership in the face of the company's antiunion behavior but
doing so would have served neither the organizing campaign nor the
21. Letter from Doug Gamble to TransParts Division President 2 (June 3, 1994) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law).
22. Letter from TransParts Division President to Doug Gamble 1 (June 9, 1994) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law).
23. Letter from Plant Manager to Fellow Employees 2 (June 15, 1994) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law).
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union's current members.
Though angry and suspicious, the local union leadership decided to
continue with the work of the partnership, leaving the organizing process to
run its own, thus far unsuccessful, course. Shortly after the union made
this decision, a second corporate initiative renewed tensions. Once again,
the local union and the local managers had to work together to determine
the meaning of a partnership within an environment that they could neither
predict nor control.
C. Whose Tree Is It, Anyway?
Until the fall of 1994, both the union and management of TransParts
referred to the partnership's governing body as the Labor Management
Steering Committee ("LMSC"). That fall, however, TransParts hired a
full-time and salaried Total Quality Coordinator ("TQC") who renamed the
body as the "Total Quality Steering Committee" ("TQ Steering
Committee"). The union's efforts to challenge this name change as
symbolic of an unwanted shift in focus failed. Nevertheless, the group,
composed of essentially equal numbers of union and management
representatives, met regularly to try to manage the ongoing work of various
departmental oversight committees and problem-solving teams. The group
also had to decide how to manage the corporation's latest training
initiative, "TQII," that broadened the TQM program to help achieve the
corporation's desired business results through customer satisfaction,
continuous improvement, and employee involvement.
Corporate headquarters then forced upon the TQ Steering Committee
a project that became the framework for negotiating both locally-generated
and corporation-driven issues. The mandate required each plant in the
division to develop for presentation to division leadership an "Integrated
Goal/Action Tree," the outline of which the division provided. The
TransParts plant manager, who had not been party to the early stages of the
partnership and who did not fully understand how the company's response
to the organizing campaign had fueled the union's suspicion of
management motives, wanted "the partnership" to develop the Goal/Action
Tree. The TQ Steering Committee agreed and immediately set to the task
for which the Division had allotted one month. The assigned task was to
use the Goal/Action Tree to outline how the facility was to become a
premier plant.
The Goal/Action Tree, as described in the materials provided by the
corporation, had three branches: customers, business results, and
employees. The union was notably absent. The union concluded that the
limited time provided to complete the project along with the predetermined
tree design reflected the facts that no other union represented workers in
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the division and that the corporation did not intend for anyone other than
top managers to be involved in the Goal/Action Tree completion. Thus, the
corporation did not expect any resistance to the design. Because of the
recent negative experience with corporate mandates, the company's
response to the organizing campaign, and indications that the new plant
manager was not sympathetic to the local union's daily contract
administration needs, the local union leadership decided to challenge the
mandated design by insisting on the addition of a new branch on the
Goal/Action Tree, called "Partnership of Union and Management
Organizations."
The Goal/Action Tree project involved the local union's entire eight-
person elected Executive Board, the international representative assigned to
the local union, and an equivalent number of top managers in the plant
(including the plant manager, comptroller, and department heads). This
group's collective history, coupled with their previous rhetorical and
material commitments to a partnership relationship, made the addition of
the new branch less difficult than the union anticipated. The union
accomplished its goal despite the fact that the plant manager initially did
not understand why the "Employees" branch did not adequately represent
the union's organizational needs, or why the union insisted on inclusion of
the word "organizations" in the branch name. In addition, the union and
management had no difficulty reaching agreements to "develop a high
performance relationship" as the overall objective of the partnership 24 and
to "maintain Labor/Management Steering Committee" along with its
requisite tasks (determine shared responsibilities, set high standards of
conduct, share business information, and so on).
The ease of these agreements contrasted with the company's initially
negative response to the union's insistence on formalizing, in the
partnership branch of the Goal/Action Tree, a commitment to "[a]chieve
and maintain mutual respect and understanding of each organization's
needs." 26 Equally contentious had been the debate over whether to allocate
company resources for developing the union's capacity to engage in the
partnership. The union won the inclusion of both these items in the
Goal/Action Tree only because it made them pivotal issues.
The union and management completed the arduous and time-
consuming process of developing the Goal/Action Tree in December 1994.
The union learned informally that their Goal/Action Tree was the only one
in the division into which hourly employees had input and was the only one
24. Partnership of Union and Management Organizations (TransParts Integrated
Goal/Action Tree) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and
Employment Law).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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with a new main branch. Corporate headquarters issued no formal report
on how the steering committee's efforts were received.
As a prolonged exercise in language use and interpretation, the
Goal/Action Tree drew upon the participants' experiences with contract
negotiation, grievances, and arbitration. At the same time, the lengthy
discussions about word choice, placement on the Goal/Action Tree, and
implications for future practice mapped out new terrain for both the union
and management in the plant. However, until the understandings that
developed through this process were embodied in the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated in 1996, they were unenforceable through the
grievance and arbitration procedures.
Most of the local union leadership, as well as a few managers,
expected that the plant would be unable to accomplish many of the goals
outlined in the Goal/Action Tree. Over the next few months little happened
to prove them wrong. Despite the collaboration in the fall, labor relations
worsened. Pressure from the parent corporation to meet business goals
intensified. In response, TransParts management, acting contrary to the
process for participatory decision making that was developed under the
partnership agreement, unilaterally changed work assignments. These
changes, also contrary to past practice, signaled the unreliability of local
management's commitment to empowerment and joint problem solving.
In May 1995, the local union leadership wrote to the plant manager,
demanding a "meeting of the Total Quality Steering Committee... to
discuss the removal from the... Integrated Goal/Action Tree the following
items which have become blatantly obvious as having absolutely no
support from the management persons of both [TransParts] and others in
positions of authority over those persons." 27 The items at issue included
thirty-six specific commitments from the Goal/Action Tree and the entire
"partnership of union and management organizations" section. The
requested meeting did not take place. Upon hearing informally that the
plant manager was on his way out, the union inferred that its concerns
would not soon be addressed. In fact, the plant manager was fired within a
month, presumably for failing to achieve the business goals listed in the
Goal/Action Tree.
D. What Does a Labor-Management Partnership Look Like (and Who
Decides)?
The new plant manager, the third in as many years, formerly worked
in another corporation in another industry. He took several months to
27. Memorandum from Local Union President to TransParts Vice-President 1 (May 4,
1995) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law).
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decide what to do with the plant's operation and how to engage the
partnership process. For guidance, he chose to rely heavily on his Human
Resources Manager ("HR Manager"), whom he had inherited from his
predecessor. The HR Manager was more skilled in labor and human
relations and more experienced in organizational development than any
other manager at TransParts in at least a decade. Given the opportunity by
the new plant manager, he launched an ambitious resurrection of the
partnership relationship and related activities. A discussion of the details
of that effort offers another example of the daily contests over the meaning
of the union-management partnership.
In August 1995, the HR Manager presented to union leaders a graphic,
computer-generated organizational chart for the plant. This diagram,
intended to achieve "[the company's] vision through integration and
guiding principles,"' 8 represented management's effort to integrate into the
actual manufacturing process numerous corporate initiatives (total quality
management, activity based management, operational excellence, lean
manufacturing, and QS-900029) and operational functions (accounting,
engineering, and human resources). The HR Manager sought to redesign
the organization with a governing structure and reporting relationships that
would encourage decision making about plant operations closer to or at the
point of production.
The company unilaterally decided to move in this direction and in this
manner. In addition, the company alone selected the items listed on the
diagram as the plant's vision and as its guiding principles. Because union
leaders believed they could work with the new plant manager and the HR
Manager to revise the content of the diagram, they decided simply to state
their objection to the company's unilateral actions and turn their attention
to the governance structure. Over the next several months, the TQ Steering
Committee met often and discussed various revisions to the governance
structure. Between meetings, the union's international representative and
the company's HR Manager faxed drafts to each other. By October, the
Committee agreed on a version and developed charters, roles, and
responsibilities for the plant's new Leadership Committee that would
replace the TQ Steering Committee and for the new Business Improvement
Teams that would manage production.
The fundamental issue for the union during this period was its location
and representation on the diagram. In the first version distributed by the
HR Manager, the union as an organization was absent though individuals
representing the union were included by name as members of various
28. Achieving Our Vision Through Integration, Partnership and Guiding Principles
(Partnership Organization Chart) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
Labor and Employment Law).
29. See infra note 34 for a description of QS-9000.
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committees and teams. From the union's perspective, for the diagram to be
an accurate representation of the partnership, it would show two
organizations-the union and the company-rather than individuals
representing each organization.
Four months later, the various components of the union's organization
were included on the diagram: the international union, the local members,
the local's executive board, the partnership team (a subset of the Executive
Board), Business Improvement Team representatives, and Union Team
Developers. These components were not represented as members of the
partnership, but independent of it, as were various corporate staff groups.
The parts of the diagram representing areas in which the union-manage-
ment partnership was, or would be engaged, were the Leadership
Committee, the Business Improvement Teams, and the "Natural Work
Teams," which the company wanted to develop in the future.
A second union concern was the inclusion of the international
representative of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile
Employees ("UNITE")30 as an ex officio member of the plant's Leadership
Committee. The local union leaders were uneasy venturing into the new
and risky role of joint management without assurances that union staff
could participate whenever the local wished. The company's
representatives did not strenuously object to the local union's need for
organizational representation in the governance structure, but the
organizational chart was modified to meet this need only because the local
union insisted that the diagram match the company's verbal assurances.
The TQ Steering Committee next worked to develop the charter, roles,
and responsibilities of the newly designated Leadership Committee. The
TQ Steering Committee agreed that the Leadership Committee's primary
role would be "to provide the strategic direction for the organization and to
integrate the efforts of the Business Improvement Teams to assure goal
attainment." 3' To fulfill this role, the Leadership Committee, now a key
element of the partnership, would be responsible for the following: "long-
term planning and budgeting; coordinating with Strategic Business Unit
and Corporate stakeholders; managing the functional policies/procedures
that span the operation to include multifunctional project teams; seek out,
support, and manage needed change in the organization and processes. 32
Shared decision making about the charter, roles, and responsibilities of the
new Leadership Committee was outside of not only the traditional terrain
of labor-management relations but also the scope of the legally mandated
30. In June of 1995, the ACTWU merged with the International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union ("ILGWU") to form UNITE. UNITE Press Release, June 29, 1995, at 1.
31. Leadership Committee Roles and Responsibilities (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law).
32. Id.
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subjects of collective bargaining.
The Leadership Committee was also responsible for the following:
1) continually strive to grow the business
2) drive the development of the partnership between the company
and the union
3) both create and capitalize upon opportunities to expand the
partnership to broader application within the operation
4) drive the successful integration of multiple initiatives through
the business
5) apply accurate logic in solving problems
6) utilize fact based problem solving tools and consensus
decision making methods.33
These commitments formalized additional new terrain open to contest
between the union and management. Furthermore, the Leadership
Committee mandate confirmed, without specific acknowledgement, many
of the implied commitments from the TransParts Integrated Goal/Action
Tree, most of which were never acted upon, as well as many of the
agreements reached three years earlier before the corporate TQM directive
crowded them out of active consideration.
The considerable achievement of defining the work of the Leadership
Committee was the first success in the latest attempt to develop a
functional partnership mechanism for running the plant. With much
fanfare, the plant manager, the local union president, and the UNITE
international representative presented the new plan to the entire TransParts
workforce. Pyramidal desk ornaments symbolizing the joint commitment
to the goals, governance, and operational mechanisms were distributed to
key participants. Over three years and without explicit discussion, the
parties had moved from a focus on joint problem solving to a vision of joint
governance of the plant.
With this momentum and under public scrutiny, the newly chartered
Leadership Committee plunged into creating the Business Improvement
Teams, pausing briefly to argue over the roles to be played by the union's
appointed representatives to the Teams. The union challenged the
company's effort to substitute the Team representatives for the union's
shop stewards who had contract administration responsibilities. The
Leadership Committee set schedules for training everyone who was to have
a role in the new governance structure, covering subjects from accounting
to interpersonal skills. For a time, it seemed as if all the years of
33. Id.
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negotiating about the meanings and forms of the partnership were going to
produce a radically new way to run the plant. The Governance Diagram
and supporting materials became guiding tools for this work.
However, three developments initiated by the parent corporation
disrupted the momentum of these efforts. First, in December 1995, the
parent corporation requested early contract negotiations (the contract was
due to expire six months later), diverting both the union's and
management's attention for several months. The following spring, the HR
Manager was promoted to a position of greater responsibility for the entire
Division. He was replaced by a younger man with strong political
connections in the corporation and without any skills for managing a
partnership with a labor union or for supporting the plant manager's desire
to run the plant in a participatory manner. With the departure of the more
experienced manager, it became apparent that he had been both the
visionary and the facilitator of the management group's contributions to the
partnership efforts. When his day-to-day involvement in the plant ended,
the person with the authority and desire to develop management's role in
the partnership was lost.
Second, the company's sudden inability (embodied in the new and
inexperienced HR Manager) to interact respectfully with union elected
leadership and to observe the collective bargaining agreement doomed the
promising efforts of the preceding months. Instead of engaging each other
on the new terrain embodied in the Governance Diagram, all parties
reverted to familiar shop-floor contests over wages, hours, and working
conditions.
Third, simultaneous with the change in leadership at TransParts, the
company mobilized to prepare the plant for QS-9000 certification. 34 Like
the corporate TQM initiative that had consumed company and union
attention soon after the first efforts to actualize the partnership in 1992, the
QS-9000 project required significant time and effort. The union's
leadership was largely preoccupied with the necessity of vigilantly
monitoring the company's actions. For example, the company's sudden
concern about the literacy of the workforce (to ensure compliance with
written QS-9000 procedures) was a potential threat to the jobs of many
older workers. The certification process became a vehicle for the company
to try to change unilaterally long-established work assignments and
performance standards.
34. QS-9000 is an international quality standard developed by the major American
automobile companies who require their suppliers, including TransParts, to be certified in
order to bid on business. Certification requires the standardization of essentially all
procedures as well as extensive training and documentation. For a union perspective on the
issues QS-9000 raises, see MAUREEN SHEAHAN ET AL., LESSONS IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT
PARTNERSHIP FOR SUCCESSFUL ISO/QS-9000 IMPLEMENTATION (1996).
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E. The Current Scenario
Contract negotiations in early 1996 were arduous in large part because
of the union's commitment to close the wage gap between TransParts
workers and those in the new joint venture facility. The new venture was
too new and too heavily capitalized to make money. Therefore, the various
corporate components of its complex decision making structure resisted the
union's demands until the end. In addition, the union had difficulty
mobilizing support among its members for larger raises for the newer
workers until it secured from management a commitment to improve
substantially workers' pension benefits, a concern of many senior
TransParts workers. By offering at least some gain to most employees, a
time-honored strategy, the negotiators managed to present for ratification a
contract accepted by most workers.
In addition to the more traditional benefit and wage agreements, the
contract included language, proposed by the union, committing the parties
to "a partnership in [TransParts] that includes, but is not limited to, the
partnership diagram, roles and responsibilities and charters for a leadership
committee and business improvement teams that have been established." 35
The language also committed the joint venture to pursuing a partnership
development process and required both union and management to agree to
any changes in these structures and roles.
The union's objective was to make enforceable the agreements and
understandings that claimed new terrain for union-management
negotiation. It remains to be seen if this objective can be accomplished or
if the union has the will and interest to test the language. As has been true
for five years, personnel changes at TransParts and the joint venture and
changes in corporate policies and strategies will have considerable bearing
on the future.
In the fall of 1997, TransParts, and the entire division of which it was
a part, was sold to a nonunion company that has pledged to accept the
current collective bargaining agreement. The new company's understand-
ing of and commitment to the labor-management partnership remains to be
seen. The joint venture is also for sale.
Ill. RETHINKING TIE TERRAIN OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The TransParts case study demonstrates that democratic workplaces
require two organizations-unions and companies-each of which has the
35. TransParts Agreement, supra note 16, at 76-77.
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capacity and authority to represent its different constituencies.36 Such a
requirement has several important implications: 1) for the laws governing
workplace relationships, 2) for companies and trade unions, 3) for
resources allocated by both unions and management for the development of
their relationships, 4) for the communities in which people live and work,
and 5) for the ways scholars and consultants can contribute to our
understanding of contested terrain in the workplace.
A. The Economic Terrain
The environment in which these contests take place is quite different
from that of a decade ago. This is especially true of the economic
environment for manufacturing. Deregulation and the accompanying
changes in trade rules, including the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), have put domestic manufacturers and their employees in
increasingly direct competition with low wage producers outside North
America, particularly in locations where huge labor pools are available.
Changes in technology, specifically in the areas of communications,
design, and manufacturing, have challenged old assumptions that North
American industries are the best in the world'. Increased control of
corporations by money managers with immediate goals and intense profit
pressures has changed the ways in which invested capital is used. As a
consequence, parochial scruples about manufacturing "at home" are out of
fashion.
Capitalists have never been motivated by a patriotic respect for state
and national boundaries. Today, they claim that honoring such boundaries
will frustrate their legal responsibility to make money for shareholders.
Consequently, corporations not only threaten to close plants and move
work to countries where labor is cheap, 37 but also frequently do so. The
threat to close a plant and move the work to lower wage locations is real
and constant. 38 Real and constant too are the daily workplace pressures
36. Management invitations to form new relationships have the potential to displace
worker interests and replace them with corporate interests. Unions provide a legally
protected position from which workers and their representatives may negotiate the terms and
conditions of employment, including partnerships and the practices sanctioned by them.
Such protection also facilitates the exploration of shared interests, as the growing successes
of interest-based bargaining have shown.
37. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Organizing in the NAFTA Environment. How Companies
Use "Free Trade" to Stop Unions, NEv LAB. F., Fall 1997, at 51, 51-60.
38. See Nina Gregg, Living with the Border in the Interior: U.S. Worker Consciousness
as Border Culture, MONTRi AL BORDERS AND CULTURES CONFERENCE (1995) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment
Law).
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that management practices place upon workers and unions. Economist
David Gordon has argued that as a result of the globalization of the
economy corporations have become "fat and mean."39 Fearful of failure,
employers have expanded the number of employees whose job it is to
watch and direct other employees. These legions of bosses increasingly
employ the stick, as distinguished from the carrot, as their management tool
of choice.4°
B. The Legal Terrain
Paralleling the contested terrain of employer-employee power in the
workplace, the legal terrain governing these relations is complex and much
debated. After the 1992 ruling of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") in In re Electromation, Inc. ,41 advocates of "employer
flexibility" in and outside of Congress sought to amend the NLRA to
permit greater employee participation in activities that were formerly the
sole prerogatives of management.42 Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which
outlaws company unions, is at the heart of the discussion.43 This provision
prohibits management from establishing or dominating any labor
organization,44 defined as an "employee representation committee or plan,
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose of...
dealing with employees concerning... conditions of work."45
A recent effort to modify section 8(a)(2) is the Teamwork for
Employees and Managers Act ("TEAM Act"), first introduced in 1994.
Unions have opposed the TEAM Act because it would allow management
to select employees' representatives in employee involvement programs.
The TEAM Act would legalize company unions and dramatically weaken
independent trade unions and their ability to represent workers in the
traditional areas of wages, hours, and working conditions. 46 Allowing
39. See DAvID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN: THE CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF WORKING
AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL "DowNSizING" 33-94 (1996).
40. See id.
41. No. 25-CA-19818, 1992 WL 386692, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 1992) (finding that
employee involvement in "Action Committees" transformed them into labor organizations
in which the employer could not interfere under the NLRA).
42. For a good discussion of the legal issues involved in amending the NLRA, see
William C. Green, The Transformation of the NLRA Paradigm: The Future of Labor
Management Relations in Post-Fordist Auto Plants, in NORTH AMERICAN AUTO UNIONS IN
CRIsIs, supra note 14, at 161; see also James R. Rundle & Patricia A. Greenfield, Worker
Representation Without Worker Consent, WORKINGUSA, July-Aug. 1997, at 62.
43. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1998).
44. See id.
45. National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1998).
46. The TEAM Act would also undermine the current national labor policy of utilizing
collective bargaining to secure industrial peace and avoid commercial disruption.
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employers to dominate the discussion about working conditions would
eliminate the existence of all but a few legitimately democratic workplaces.
Unless workers have the independent and collective power and resources to
speak the truth about a work site and to act without fear, few managers will
permit workplace democracy-in the form of freedom of speech-to exist
for long.
C. The Labor Movement's Terrain
The environment for these issues within the labor movement is
changing. In 1995, the "New Voice" leadership team of John Sweeney,
Richard Trumka, and Linda Chavez-Thompson ousted the long-entrenched
and increasingly ineffective leaders of the AFL-CIO. The Sweeney team
and a largely revamped staff have begun to lead efforts to reverse decades
of unions' indifference to unions' organizing and to their relationships with
corporations. A new AFL-CIO Department of Corporate Affairs oversees
efforts to change corporate governance and to promote workplace
democracy.
Similarly, many unions are devoting specific attention to considering
their role in the control and nature of workplaces and corporations. 47 For
example, Bob Chase, president of the two million member National
Education Association ("NEA"), is advocating a new partnership approach
to the relationship between teachers and administrators. 4S Additionally,
Kris Rondeau, lead organizer of the Harvard University Clerical and
Technical Workers Union, acknowledges that after negotiating joint
See Fred Burmester, The TEAM Act---"Employee Participation Plans" Versus
"Company Unions": The Irony of Attempting to Reform American Labor Policy via a
Japanese Labor Policy Which Is Itself a Reformation ("Corruption?") of the American
Labor Policy Imposed Upon Japan in the Final Settlement of World War II, 23 J. CONTEMP.
L. 307 (1997), for an interesting history and analysis of this issue. For a discussion about
the debate over whether the danger posed by employer domination depends on whether the
employer has antiunion intentions, see id. at 359-62.
For a clear argument that section 8(a)(2) was intended to guarantee free collective
bargaining concerning a broad range of workplace relations and to bar alternative forms of
workplace representation, see David Brody, Section 8(a)(2) and the Origins of the Wagner
Act, in REsTORiNG THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, 29 (Sheldon Friedman et al.
eds., 1994).
47. For a brief and useful discussion of these changes in union roles, see Bruce Nissen,
Unions and Workplace Reorganization, UNIONS AND WORKPLACE REORGANIZATION, supra
note 14, at 9. See also Tom Juravich, Employee Involvement, Work Reorganization, and the
New Labor Movement: Toward a Radical Integration, NEw LAB. F., Spring 1998, at 84, for
a thoughtful plea for the integration of employee involvement efforts into the broader
resurgence of unions in organizing and politics.
48. See Leah Samuel, NEA Embraces Partnership, LAB. NOTES, Sept. 1997, at 8, 8; see
also Don Stillman, Interview: Bob Chase, NEA President, WORKINGUSA, July-Aug. 1997,
at 53, 53-61.
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decision making in their first contract, under a new administration "we've
been unsuccessful in finding partners in a decentralized university."'49
Perhaps the best evidence of change in the environment within the
labor movement for new workplace relationships is the adoption of a
statement of definitions and policies on workplace democracy by the
Executive Council of the AFL-CIO in February 1997. The statement
supports the work of the Committee on Workplace Democracy that helps
"unions gain more power in the workplace for our members (both individu-
ally and collectively)-particularly in areas of decision-making which have
traditionally and legally been management's prerogative."
50
It is a hopeful sign that the AFL-CIO is thinking about these issues.
Its Center for Workplace Democracy maintains several assumptions: 1)
only with a strong union presence throughout a whole organization or
system (from a plant to an entire corporation) can there be a democratic
workplace; 2) a democratic workplace is a precondition for a viable "high
performance" workplace; and 3) viable "high performance" workplaces are
crucial to the future of organized labor in North America.
D. Theoretical and Practical Terrain
An increasing number of trade unionists are accepting the Center's
assumptions, but the same cannot be said for most managers and workplace
theorists. In fact, management in North America has historically created
and maintained workplaces that, contrary to the Center's second
assumption, are bureaucratic and autocratic, characteristics encouraged by
law and tradition. Moreover, conventional measures of management
performance reinforce old-style leadership and supervision. Thus,
struggles in workplaces over familiar subjects such as wages, hours, and
working conditions continue to occupy the time, energy, and attention of
most managers and trade unionists. The forging of new relationships is
also undermined by management turnover. Seldom is there enough
continuity among managers for management to sustain new initiatives with
employees and unions. Local unions, lacking the requisite authority, are
rarely able to compensate for management's limitations. Further, it is
unusual for a local union to undertake independent strategic planning that
49. JOHN HOERR, WE CAN'T EAT PRESTIGE: THE WOMEN WHO ORGANIZED HARvARD
260 (1997).
50. AFL-CIO ExECUTrvE COUNCIL, STATEMENT ON WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY (1997).
An earlier AFL-CIO statement on changes in the workplace is the centerpiece of UNIONS
AND WORKPLACE REORGANIZATION, supra note 14, which consists of essays responding to
COMMITTEE ON THE EVOLUTION OF WORK, AFL-CIO, THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE: A
LABOR PERSPECTIVE (1994), reprinted in UNIONS AND WORKPLACE REORGANIZATION, supra,
at 37, 37-54.
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would enable it to create or sustain fundamental challenges to conventional
management practices.i
Under current laws, democratically-inspired challenges to traditional
management authority within workplaces are generally ineffective,
especially in the absence of the countervailing power of a union. In theory,
a union contract protects individual employees who challenge
mismanagement despite management's right to fire employees at will. In
reality, however, the presence of a union within a workplace provides no
legal means to contest management's rights. Even with a contract, neither
employees nor unions can safely contest management's decisions on many
fundamental issues that affect an enterprise's viability, including
investments or technology. Without the consent or tolerance of
management, employees cannot fully participate in the governance and
management of a workplace, even when a union represents them.
52
Numerous thoughtful observers of trends in workplaces believe that
participatory work sites are more efficient than autocratic ones and that
they are the wave of the future.53 However, few have explained how the
demise of workplace autocracy will occur. Some commentators imply that
managers will abandon their authority because it is the right thing to do in a
democratic country, while others seem to believe that an economic motive
will drive the movement toward more workplace participation. Most trade
unionists do not take either idea seriously because: 1) they believe from
experience that the real functional motivator for many, if not most,
managers is the maintenance of their power over others, including both
workers and other managers; and 2) they know from experience that
seldom is there adequate continuity of managers or corporate philosophy
for management to lead effectively or maintain a fundamental
51. See Peter Lazes & Jane Savage, New Unionism and the Workplace of the Future, in
UNIONS AND WORKPLACE REORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 181, for a plea for unions to
engage in strategic planning on the subject of workplace reorganization.
52. For a brief and useful discussion of the absence in workplaces of the fundamental
democratic rights needed for people to challenge autocracy, see Jim Grattan, Worker
Democracy and Employee Involvement Plans, in UNIONS AND WORKPLACE
REORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 78.
An important example of a vital area of workplace design over which unions have no
power to bargain is the introduction of new technology. See, e.g., Charley Richardson,
Avoiding the Tricks and Traps of Involvement: Developing a New Model for Powerfid
Bargaining in a Changing Workplace, NEw LAB. F., Spring 1998, at 104.
53. For instance, Denis Collins has written an interesting study of several specific gain-
sharing programs and argues "in favor of the inevitability of participatory management on
the basis of its coherence to the social-philosophical assumptions about human nature that,
in the United States underlies the forms of political arrangements (democracy) and
economic arrangements (mixed economy)." DENIS COLLINS, GAINSHARING AND POWER:
LESSONS FROM SIX SCANLON PLANS 234 (1998).
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organizational change program.
54
IV. THE ROLE OF UNIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WORKPLACE
In our view, strong unions are critical to the success of North
American enterprises trying to survive in a global market. Yet many
leaders in discussions about the future of work and workers either abhor
unions or seriously underestimate how necessary they are to fundamental
democratic workplace and social change. Our thinking is clearly against
the political and intellectual mainstream. The "free trade" mania is built on
the false notion that all economic entities have equal power and can
compete internationally if free to do so. The "empowerment" mania
similarly rests on the false assumption that individual workers can and will
help improve the performance of their work sites if free to do so
("empowered"). In both cases, people with power benefit from this
"freedom" of small enterprises and individual workers to rationalize trade
and production systems in ways that benefit neither workers as a class nor
society in general. 55 With no mechanisms in place for representing
collective, community, class, or social needs, corporations' global rush to
be competitive will continue to undermine workers' standards of living by
continuously seeking the lowest cost of production.
Because a main goal of trade unions is to raise workers' standards of
living, we should expect trade unions to resist actions that accelerate the
worldwide decline of living standards. For example, in the United States
we have seen such efforts in cross-border solidarity, mobilization against
free trade, anti-sweatshop campaigns, and strikes over outsourcing. To
interpret such resistance on the part of trade unionists as indifference to
efforts to improve workplaces overlooks an important resource in the
movement for workplace efficiency. Such an interpretation also deprives
the movemenf for workplace democracy of its only possible advocates with
the potential power actually to effect change.
Even the World Bank, hardly known for its advocacy of trade unions,
54. See Nina Gregg & Doug Gamble, Can Labor and Management Work as Partners?,
AT WORK, July-Aug. 1998, at 13, for a discussion about how management turnover was a
significant factor in the TransParts case.
55. As Bachrach and Botwinick observe, "[w]orkers and their allies, including
progressive political theorists, must come to see [workplace democracy].. . as something
worth fighting for in a new class struggle that is fully within the accepted tradition of
American democracy." Bachrach & Botwinick, supra note 8, at 18. For example,
workplace teams, a popular form of management-driven employee involvement, are one
example of new work systems that do not necessarily benefit workers. See James R. Barker,
Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self-Managing Teams, 38 ADMIN. SC. Q.
408 (1993) (providing a chilling ethnographic study of the coercive potential of workplace
teams).
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concurs:
Free trade unions are a cornerstone of any effective system of
industrial relations that seeks to balance the need for enterprises
to remain competitive with the aspirations of workers for higher
wages and better working conditions. Unions act as agents for
labor, organizing large numbers of workers into a single entity
whose collective bargaining power matches that of the employer.
Trade unions.., can help raise workplace productivity and
reduce workplace discrimination.
56
In contrast, a recent study published in a leading journal of industrial
and labor relations is based on the assumptions that reform efforts utilizing
employee involvement are intended to encourage individual workers to
achieve employer-defined goals, and that "high performance" workplaces
can be developed and maintained without addressing issues of power and
autocracy in the workplace.
5 7
In theory, unions may have some power relative to management with
which they can bargain for more democratic workplaces. Whether they can
or will use this power remains unclear. Although no consensus exists on
why the American labor movement represents a historically small
percentage of workers, few doubt that employer hostility and opposition to
unions and to organizing efforts are key factors. Employers' aggressive,
and often illegal, opposition to organizing rightfully commands the
attention of advocates of legal reforms that would make it easier for unions
to win recognition and achieve desirable contracts. However, these
reforms may be insufficient to overcome antiunion corporate strategies. As
Paul Weiler explains:
A large majority of American businesses do make it a basic aim
of their corporate strategy to remain (or to become) as union-free
as possible in their domestic (if not their foreign) operations.
This strategy influences the firms' patterns of investment, their
location decisions, the design of their compensation packages,
56. The World Bank, World Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating
World 79 (1995).
57. See Peter Cappelli & Nikolai Rogovsky, Employee Involvement and Organizational
Citizenship: Implications for Labor Law Reform and "Lean Production", 51 INDuS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 633 (1998). The authors distinguish employee involvement in issues of work
organization from those involving the terms and conditions of employment and measure the
effectiveness of each kind of involvement in developing "organizational citizenship
behavior." Id. at 648. The authors then assert that "involvement aimed at work
organization issues is the important factor that drives employee outcomes, especially where
that involvement can effect the redesign of job characteristics associated with individual
tasks." Id. Cappelli and Rogovsky conclude "[a]rrangements... that make the reform of
job characteristics easier are therefore more likely to have an impact on performance than
are arrangements at a higher level in the organization, like joint labor-management
committees and other representative systems." Id.
1998]
454 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 1:2
and the type of employees they interview and hire. The success
of all employers in union avoidance is greatly enhanced by the
illegal activities of the "bare knuckles" minority.
58
Under current United States labor law, organizing workers into unions
is essentially impossible when an employer is determined not to be
challenged by an organization that could represent workers as a group.
Laws that make organizing difficult thwart not only unions but also
workplace democracy and increased efficiency. The weakness of trade
unions in the United States should concern those who value democracy or
the viability of American businesses. Strengthening the economic perfor-
mance of a workplace very often requires encroaching on management's
ability to choose control over efficiency or short-term economic
performance over sustainable achievement.59  However, enabling trade
unions to organize and represent more workers will permit neither unions
nor individual employees to challenge management's control of work sites
because few legal mechanisms currently exist to mount such a challenge.
Unions must also give increased attention to the representation issue
as employers proffer variations on partnerships and similar alliances. What
does it mean to represent workers in the new terrain of partnerships and
other relationships? American labor law holds trade unions to specific
obligations in the representation of their members. In doing so, the law
affirms a model of collective representation that owes its design as much to
the opponents of trade unionism as to unionists' themselves. How else
58. Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: Employee Representation in the Eyes of
the Law, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FuTuRE DIRECTIONS 81, 85
(Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993). For an enlightening study of
employer opposition to union organizing efforts, see Richard W. Hurd & Joseph B. Uehlein,
Patterned Responses to Organizing: Case Studies of the Union-Busting Convention, in
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 46, at 61.
59. Increasing evidence indicates that the economic performance of unionized
workplaces with worker-involvement programs is better over time than that of nonunion
ones. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary Innovations in
Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC
COMPETrriVENESS 173 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992); Maryellen R. Kelley
& Bennett Harrison, Unions, Technology, and Labor-Management Cooperation, in UNIONS
AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, supra, at 247.
A new study by Lisa M. Lynch of Tufts University and Sandra E. Black of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York "found that unionized shops dominate the ranks of [the United
States'] most productive workplaces," that "most of the union shops had adopted so-called
formal quality programs, in which up to half the workers meet regularly to discuss
workplace issues" and that "production workers at these establishments shared in the firms'
profits, and more than a quarter did their jobs in self-managed teams." Update, KNOXVILLE
NEws-SENTIMEL, Aug. 10, 1998, at B4; see also Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, How to
Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and Information Technology on Productivity,
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Washington, D.C.), Aug.
1997, at i.
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might unions represent their members? Creative answers to this question
are critical to formulating informed responses to invitations like the one the
TransParts plant manager extended to the union in 1991.60
Whether unions choose new or old forms of representation, contests
over the meaning of the labor-management relationship require diligence,
competence, and confidence. Without the resources to enable union
leaders to engage as equals in rhetorical and ideological struggles and
without access to the means of communication, unions are often defeated
before the contest has begun. Furthermore, the parties working together to
forge a partnership are regularly engaged in contentious grievance
hearings. For union leaders, the combination can be especially trying, as
the statutory obligation to defend vigorously members' contractual rights
occurs within the new terrain of partnership. The same managers populate
both sites. Even with diligence, competence, and confidence, two
conditions constrain workers' ability to prevail over their employers: 1)
market conditions and government policies that neither workers nor
individual employers control; and 2) the reality of unequal power relations.
V. CONCLUSION
In most workplaces, including unionized ones, opportunities for
workers to challenge mismanagement are rare. As Jim Grattan succinctly
writes:
Any worker rights within the NLRA framework are a result of
the dynamics of private contract negotiations between employers
and labor organizations.... Under the NLRA, worker
empowerment is, at best, obtained indirectly by negotiating
highly detailed shop-floor rules that constrain unilateral manage-
ment actions, and is probably more accurately characterized as
worker protection, not worker empowerment.6'
Laws that restrict unions' ability to contest management for control of
workplaces thwart not only increased workplace efficiency and democracy,
but also unions' ability to organize. Surveys clearly show that nonunion
workers want more influence in their workplaces but generally do not see
unions as a useful means to achieve that goal. 62
60. See supra Part II.A.
61. Grattan, supra note 52, at 81. See Robert J. Pleasure & Patricia A. Greenfield,
From Servants to Workers: A Modem Law of Work in the United States, in INDUSTRiAL
RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL
MEETING 180 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1995), for an intriguing proposal to create a "law of
work" that is broader and more relevant to an economy of instability than the more narrow
law of labor-management relations.
62. See Richard Freeman & Joel Rogers, Worker Representation and Participation
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Similarly, limiting workers' contributions to the collective bargaining
arena, as law currently defines it, is inadequate. Workers and their unions
must have the ability and the right to influence decisions in those arenas
traditionally reserved for management, like investments, accounting and
measurement, economic development, product design, staffing, and quality.
Commentators argue that changes in laws regarding corporate governance
should accompany changes in the legal structure of collective bargaining if
the commitment to democratizing workplaces is sincere.63  Anyone
rethinking law in the twenty-first century workplace must consider these
issues.
Survey: Second Report of Findings (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law); Richard B. Freeman &
Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us?: Employee Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market,
in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FuTURE DIRECTIONS, supra note 58, at
13 (their well-publicized national study).
63. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899
(1993).
However, there remain complex issues to be resolved. For instance, unless the laws
relating to the fiduciary responsibilities of union representatives on corporate boards of
directors are changed, it appears unlikely that the interests of workers as employees,
distinguished from workers as owners, can be advanced in corporate boardrooms. See Larry
W. Hunter, Can Strategic Participation be Institutionalized?: Union Representation on
American Corporate Boards, 51 INnus. LAB. REL. REv. 557, 557-58 (1998).
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